Abstract-The Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) may be considered as a generalization of the probability theory, which assigns mass values to the subsets of the referential set and suggests an interval-valued probability measure. There have been several attempts for fuzzy generalization of the DST by assigning mass (probability) values to the fuzzy subsets of the referential set. The interval-valued probability measures thus obtained are not equivalent to the original fuzzy body of evidence. In this paper, a new generalization of the DST is put forward that gives a fuzzy-valued definition for the belief, plausibility, and probability functions over a finite referential set. These functions are all equivalent to one another and to the original fuzzy body of evidence. The advantage of the proposed model is shown in three application examples. It can be seen that the proposed generalization is capable of modeling the uncertainties in the real world and eliminate the need for extra preassumptions and preprocessing.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Dempster-Shafer Theory
T HE Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) could be considered as a generalization of the probability theory [1] - [3] . Consider a set-valued mapping :
, where is the set of all nonfuzzy subsets of . The referential set is a finite set through this paper. Assume a probability measure over ; now, what can be said about a probability measure over that is induced by ? This is the basic question in [1] , where Dempster shows that for each , belongs to the following interval: in which is any nonempty member of the range of and Range (2) About ten years later Shafer introduced his evidence theory and defined and functions. Consider a referential set ; a body of evidence is defined as follows [2] : (3) in which each is a focal element, and is the corresponding mass value. Evidence theory could be considered as a direct generalization of Bayesian statistics [3] . One may think of mass values as probability density values; but in evidence theory, mass values are assigned to the subsets of instead of the elements of ; so, it conveys a higher level of uncertainty and is capable of modeling both ignorance and indeterminism. Shafer defined the concepts of belief and plausibility as two measures over the subsets of in an axiomatic manner and then he showed that and with the following definitions were belief and plausibility functions (4) (5) Using the concept of Möbius inversion, Shafer proved a oneto-one correspondence between (3)-(5); i.e., if we have each one of function, function, or body of evidence, then we may build up the others two. Although Shafer's approach was totally different from Dempster's, he obtained the same results. So, when we refer to the DST we mean both approaches with their corresponding results and interpretations.
In his capital study [1] , Dempster had also introduced the set of consistent probability measures. is a set of probability density values over ( , ), which defines a probability measure : over , accordingly. Remark: The name set of consistent probability measures is a bit confusing since it really consists of ( )'s which are probability density values not probability measures ( 's). However, we saved this name from the original work by Dempster [1] to make a clear reference to the wellknown concept of Definition 1. There is an obvious one-toone correspondence between ( )'s and 's, i.e., basically they are equivalent.
In [1] , Dempster showed that
So, the set of consistent probability measures also has a one to one correspondence with function and function as well as the body of evidence.
B. Generalizing the DST to Fuzzy Sets
While DST assigns mass values to the subsets, rather than the elements of , one may still wish to build up the probability concept over the fuzzy subsets of , [4] and [5] . Let us define a fuzzy body of evidence like (3), the only difference being that all the 's, and , can be normal fuzzy subsets of as well as nonfuzzy ones. The pioneering work in this connection was due to Zadeh [4] . Based on his works on information granularity [4] and possibility theory [6] , he extended to a fuzzy set-valued mapping, and defined expected certainty ( ) and expected possibility ( ) and then defined generalized and functions as follows: (9) (10) where is the set of all normal fuzzy subsets of . The expected certainty and possibility functions (9) and (10) reduce to (4) and (5) using two-valued logic definition for and . For two-valued logic, implication ( ) would be . Ishizuka [7] and Yager [8] used alternative fuzzy definitions for and and got different and functions. These definitions had the following structure: (11) only with different interpretations for . One might think of as a degree of inclusion. Ogawa [9] used relative sigma count instead of . Some other possible definitions for
[following the structure of (11)] were introduced in [10] .
Yen counted three deficiencies with the existing fuzzy generalizations of the DST [5] :
1) the belief functions are not sensitive enough to the significant changes in focal elements; 2) the definition of fuzzy implication is not unique; 3) there is no reasonable interpretation for and functions as lower and upper probabilities.
To resolve these problems, Yen extended different parts of the problem based on the Dempster's approach and then added them up to obtain a satisfactory fuzzy generalization of the DST. Yen's generalization was based on (7), where he extended the definition of using Zadeh's probability measure of fuzzy events [11] (12) and he approximated the fuzzy body of evidence with a nonfuzzy one, in a reasonable way. Where in (12) referred to the corresponding set of consistent probability measures for the nonfuzzy approximation. Yen's generalization saves the structure of (11) with the following function:
where and , . Although Yen's generalization seems more reasonable than the others, it cannot resolve the three deficiencies which were posed by himself, completely. While (13) is more sensitive to the changes in the focal elements, it was shown in [10] that it still suffers from probabilistic meaningless statements.
Example 2-Restated from [5, Section V(E) ]: Consider a body of evidence in the DST over with the following focal elements: Suppose and ; then using (13) . In Example 2, we face with a case in which , which does not have a meaningful probabilistic interpretation. We don't have such a problem in the DST itself or in any of the previous generalizations. Elsewhere, we have suggested novel fuzzy generalizations of the DST [10] . However, neither our suggested generalizations nor any of the previously suggested generalizations were completely satisfactory or advantageous, and neither have a completely proper probabilistic interpretation.
Another recent fuzzy generalization of the DST is due to Mahler [12] . This generalization is restricted to finite level fuzzy sets, i.e., all fuzzy membership functions take their values only from a fixed finite list , , , , , . function in this generalization again has the structure of (11), where is substituted with the crisp definition of degree of inclusion, i.e., is equal to one if and zero, otherwise. Mahler's method is based on the algebra of the lattice of the finite-level fuzzy subsets of the referential set. Therefore, it has a firm mathematical foundation. However, still and functions in this extension suffer from some of the deficiencies counted by Yen [5] .
function with a crisp interpretation of the degree of inclusion of fuzzy sets in , is not sensitive enough to the significant changes in focal elements. Also, we can have and, in this case especially, values, which cannot be well interpreted as lower and upper probabilities. For instance, the value of a finite-level fuzzy set which has a small nonempty intersection with all focal elements is one. This result is independent from the height of intersection. The problem comes from the fact that in (11) accepts only values in Mahler's generalization.
C. Proposal: A Fuzzy Valued Measure
All the existing fuzzy generalizations of the DST, including Yen's and Mahler's generalizations, preserve the structure of (11) . Therefore, they all result in an interval-valued probability for a fuzzy event (14) We conjectured in [10] that a fuzzy-valued interpretation of the probability might resolve all the problems (15) The advantage of a fuzzy-valued probability measure in a fuzzy environment has already been mentioned in the literature [13] , [14] . In the following sections, we will first look at fuzzy extension principle [15] from a viewpoint that has already been introduced by the authors [16] . Then in Section III, we build, step by step, a fuzzy generalization of the DST, which results in the probability of a fuzzy event as a fuzzy number rather than an interval. This generalization is based on the results of Section II. We will show the probabilistic meaning of this generalization. The existing generalizations will be intervalvalued approximations of this fuzzy valued measure, in the sense that all previous and values are among the possible fuzzy and values of our method. Besides, unlike the previous generalizations, we will prove a one-toone correspondence between our and functions and the fuzzy body of evidence, i.e., one can reconstruct the original fuzzy body of evidence if one knows or function. It should be noted that using the fuzzy generalization of Möbius inversion for lattice, Mahler also introduces a one to one correspondence between function of his generalization and the fuzzy body of evidence. However, that result is only true for finite-level fuzzy sets.
In Section IV, the proposed generalization will be evaluated using three application examples, among them an evidential reasoning and a diabetes diagnosis problem. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Section V.
II. A GENERALIZATION SCHEME
A. Fuzzy Extension Principle
The fuzzy extension principle was introduced by Zadeh as a useful tool to extend the point-valued functions and relations to fuzzy set-valued ones [15] . Consider a function (16) or more generally a relation (17) Fuzzy extension principle extends to as follows: (18) (19) A large part of fuzzy arithmetic stems from (18) and (19) .
B. Fuzzy Extension of Set-Valued Functions
While (18) and (19) can be used to extend point-valued functions to fuzzy-valued ones, one may ask if it is possible to extend set-valued functions as well. Consider a set-valued function (20) A fuzzy set-valued function (21) is a fuzzy extension of if (22) Zadeh has already suggested a way to extend (20) to (21) in [15] (23) where is the cut of fuzzy set , . Definition (23) deeply depends on the resolution S A S P = f(p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 )jp i 0, i p i = 1g.
identity [15] . It was shown in [16] that (23) So, if a set-valued function preserves the inclusion order, we may extend it to a fuzzy set-valued function in a consistent way. The extended function again preserves the inclusion order. We will use the idea of (25) in Section III to introduce a fuzzy generalization of the DST, which will lead us to a fuzzy-valued probability instead of an interval-valued one. where and are sets of consistent probability measures for (27) and (28), respectively.
III. GENERALIZATION OF THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY
A. A Fundamental Observation
Proof: See Appendix A. Now, consider a fuzzy body of evidence (31) We define the cut of a fuzzy body of evidence as follows.
Definition 5-Cut of a Fuzzy Body of Evidence: Consider a fuzzy body of evidence (31), the cut of the fuzzy body of evidence is defined as a nonfuzzy body of evidence, which consists of the cuts of the focal elements with no change in the mass values (32)
To make sure ; , all the focal elements 's are assumed normal. The corresponding set of consistent probability measures for (32) may be denoted by and based on Theorem 4 we have
So, we face with a nested family of the sets of consistent probability measures. If we have the cuts of a fuzzy body of evidence , then we may reconstruct the fuzzy body of evidence and vice versa. Therefore, these two are equivalent.
B. Fuzzy Set of Consistent Probability Measures
Extension of set-valued functions to fuzzy set-valued functions has been discussed in Section II-B. If the original setvalued function preserves the inclusion order, then the fuzzy extension will be a consistent one. We may describe this verbally as: the cut of the mapping the mapping of the cut. Now, if we look at (33) we have a family of cuts of the fuzzy body of evidence and a family of sets of consistent probability measures correspondingly; and this correspondence preserves an inclusion order. This property yields the idea for the following definition.
Definition 6-Fuzzy Set of Consistent Probability Measures: Consider a fuzzy body of evidence (31), and its consecutive family of cuts as defined in (32), where for each cut we have the corresponding set of consistent probability measures, . The fuzzy set of consistent probability measures for the fuzzy body of evidence is defined as follows: (34) where is a fuzzy subset of , , and is the set of all possible probability measures (probability density values) over .
We may describe Definition 6 verbally as follows: The cut of the fuzzy set of consistent probability measures which corresponds to the fuzzy body of evidence
The set of consistent probability measures which corresponds to the cut of the fuzzy body of evidence.
Theorem 7: The fuzzy set of consistent probability measures [ in (34)] is equivalent to the fuzzy body of evidence (31). Proof: Based on the definition of , and cut of a fuzzy body of evidence is trivial.
Theorem 8: The fuzzy set of consistent probability measures [ in (34)] is a normal convex fuzzy set. Proof: A fuzzy set is convex if and only if all of its cuts are convex [17] . So is convex if and only if is convex.
is the set of consistent probability measures for the cut of the fuzzy body of evidence; so it could be represented by a set of linear constraints, (6) or (71), which leads to a convex feasible space [18] . So, ; is convex.
is also normal because all the focal elements has already been assumed normal, so .
C. Fuzzy Valued , , and Functions
Once we define the fuzzy set of consistent probability measures, which corresponds with the fuzzy body of evidence, it is easy to define , , and functions. Referring to (7) and (8), we can define and as the minimum and maximum values for over ; but here we have a fuzzy feasible space so we are faced with a fuzzy decision making problem [19] .
Definition 9-Fuzzy Valued and Functions: Consider a fuzzy body of evidence (31) with its corresponding fuzzy set of consistent probability measures . and functions are defined as follows:
If we use Zadeh's probability of fuzzy events [like (12) ] then we may also define and over
Fuzzy and functions are defined based on their cuts here.
Maximization and minimization processes in (35)-(38) are operations on real numbers since we break up the fuzzy decision making problem into a sequence of nonfuzzy decision making problems using the concept of cuts. A typical fuzzy decision making problem is shown in Fig. 1 . As noted in [19] , it is nothing but fusion of goals and constraints. Here we have a nonfuzzy goal and fuzzy constraint . If one thinks a fuzzy valued definition of is more reasonable, e.g., [20] , basically there is no problem. In that case, we have a fuzzy goal. The decision will be fuzzy not only because of but also because of .
Definition 10-Fuzzy Valued
Function: Consider a fuzzy body of evidence (31) with its corresponding fuzzy set of consistent probability measures,
. For each , function will be defined, based on (35) and (36), as follows: (39) and more generally for each based on (37) and (38) as follows:
is a fuzzy subset of unit interval, [0, 1]. 
D. Mean, Mode, and Entropy
We can introduce mean for a fuzzy body of evidence, as well as mode, entropy, or any other similar probabilistic function. Consider a fuzzy body of evidence (31) over and its corresponding fuzzy set of consistent probability measures , which was introduced in (34). We may represent with its membership function and for
Now, consider a point-valued function over the possible values of (42) Based on the extension principle-Section II-we can define the fuzzy value of for as follows:
where is a fuzzy subset of the range of . Let's consider the probability of a fuzzy event
The fuzzy probability is defined as
it is easy to show that (45) is equivalent to (40). A weighted mean for the fuzzy body of evidence is the general case of the above function 
. (a) Fuzzy representation of YOUNG, OLD, and MIDDLE (linguistic labels for age). (b) Pr(YOUNG). (c) Pr(OLD). (d) Pr(MIDDLE). (e)
Mean of the body of evidence.
We can introduce mode and entropy of the fuzzy body of evidence, as well Mode:
Entropy:
(49) , Mode, and Entropy in the above definitions are fuzzy subsets of their range. and Entropy are convex and normal, but Mode is not necessarily convex.
Example 13-Continued from Example 2:
Suppose , , and . Using the Yen's method however, our method gives two fuzzy subsets of [0, 1] as and (Fig. 2) . The mean of this fuzzy body of evidence based on (47) is shown in Fig. 3 .
If we use Yen's nonfuzzy approximation of the fuzzy body of evidence [ in (12) ], then we get as an interval-valued mean. 
E. Comparison with the Existing Generalizations
All the previous fuzzy generalizations of the DST preserve the structure of (11) and give an interval-valued interpretation for the probability (50) but our generalization gives a fuzzy valued interpretation for the probability-(40) or equivalently, (45). Consider a fuzzy body of evidence (31). For every fuzzy set , so
If we can prove (52) then we have
(53) means, in (50) lies among possible belief values of our generalization. The same thing is correct for ; and Fig. 4 
explains this relation.
Theorem 14: Equation (52) is held by Zadeh [4] , Ishizaka [7] , Yager [8] , Yen [5] , and Mahler [12] generalizations of the DST.
Proof: See Appendix C. So the belief and plausibility values of these five existing generalizations of the DST stay within possible belief and plausibility values of our generalization. One may consider a typical [ , ] interval, in one of the previous generalizations, as an interval-valued approximation of our fuzzy-valued probability. Now, the vagueness in the pointvalued definition of the and seems natural since there are many possible values for and . We can defuzzify belief and plausibility values in different ways so we may obtain different point-valued approximations. The result of Theorem 14 cannot be proven for Ogawa's generalization. His generalization does not reduce to the DST for nonfuzzy body of evidence, so it doesn't have a logical correspondence with the DST.
If we think of previous generalizations as interval-valued approximations of a fuzzy-valued probability measure, Yen's method seems more reasonable. Yen approximates the fuzzy body of evidence-or based on our view point he approximates the fuzzy set of consistent probability measures-with a nonfuzzy one and then the point-valued approximations of belief and plausibility functions will be defined naturally, while others have tried to define the belief and plausibility values directly.
As explained in Example 2, for a focal element, , in Yen's generalization we may face with , which doesn't have a proper probabilistic interpretation. This observation has motivated us to develop a new generalization for the DST. Now, for our generalization, we will show that for every focal element in a fuzzy body of evidence there is at least one possible belief value which is greater than or equal to . The possibility of this belief value would be one.
Theorem 15: Consider a fuzzy body of evidence (31) and the corresponding fuzzy function as defined in (36). For each focal element in the body of evidence there is at least one such that and (54)
Proof: See Appendix D.
IV. APPLICATIONS
The applicability of proposed generalization of the DST is shown in three different examples in this section. It should be noted that the aim is not to compare our method with the previous ones based on its numerical accuracy, but to demonstrate its generality and match with the reality. Our model has the capability of handling a higher level of uncertainty, so we claim it is more compatible with the real world. When the behavior of the phenomenon under study is determinate or without vagueness, our model is not necessary, simpler models or approximate ones can be used. One should pay the cost of our more complicated model when previous simpler models can not reflect the different levels of uncertainty inherent in the underlying system. Note that in all parts of this section we will denote the mass value of a focal element with instead of .
A. Evidential Reasoning
The following typical example of evidential reasoning has been adopted from [21] :
Suppose and are two variables that take their possible values from two spaces, and , respectively. Spaces and are referred to as the evidence space and the hypothesis space. A body of evidence for the hypothesis space is constituted by 1) a set of rules that associate values of the two variables in the form of where and is a fuzzy subset of and 2) a probability distribution of the evidence space ». Now, consider the following set of rules: where OLD and YOUNG are fuzzy subsets of [14, 80] . One may consider UNKNOWN as ignorance, which will be shown with referential set (here [14, 80] 
Now, to have a judgment based on all the existing evidences these two bodies of evidences should be combined. To this end, we will use a modified version of Dempster's rule of combination [1] besides a normalization process [5] ; the following combined body of evidence will be obtained:
where YOUNG OLD is the normalized form of YOUNG OLD.
(g) (h) 5(a) shows the fuzzy representation of OLD, YOUNG, and MIDDLE as fuzzy subsets of [14, 80] ; these are linguistic labels which may assign to our linguistic variable "age." Fig. 5(b)-(d) shows the probability of these three labels, as normal convex fuzzy subsets of [0, 1] using (40) as the definition of probability for a fuzzy body of evidence. Fig. 5(e) shows the mean of the fuzzy body of evidence (64), which is a normal convex fuzzy subsets of [14, 80] , and is calculated using (47).
Let us compare the results with what we obtain from Yen's generalization:
(YOUNG) in (65) is an interval approximation of what defined in Fig. 5(b) as the probability. Equations (66) and (67) are also interval approximations for the fuzzy-valued probabilities in parts (b) and (c) of Fig. 5 , respectively. As noted in Section III, while Yen's generalization may be considered as the most rational approximation, sometimes we may need more accurate-in adaptation with reality-results. For example, if we have a mechanism to assign a combination of linguistic labels-out of a term set-to each fuzzy probability, then the interval approximation of the probability is not enough. Mean of the fuzzy body of evidence, Fig. 5(e) , may be considered as one of the best indexes that shows our overall judgment based on the existing evidence. Here we can say "John is middle aged or somehow old."
B. Diabetes Diagnosis
Shenoy [22] suggests a Bayesian method to represent, make a decision and solve a diabetes diagnosis problem: "A medical intern is trying to decide a policy for treating patients suspected of suffering from diabetes. The intern first observes whether a patient exhibits two symptoms of diabetes-blue toe and glucose in the urine. After she observes the presence or absence of these symptoms, she then either prescribes a treatment for diabetes or does not."
Now we face two questions: 1) what if a binary model could not describe the observation properly and 2) are these two symptoms still useful in the presence of fuzzy uncertainty? Table II shows the conditional probability of for different conditions; we used the Dempster's rule of conditioning to this end, which is a special case of Dempster's rule of combination [1] , [5] . Although we consider a fuzzy body of evidence in the frame of our generalization of the DST, the conditional probability of in this special case would be a number rather than a fuzzy valued probability or an interval. This is due to the special structure of our example. Fig. 7 , on the other hand, shows some of fuzzy valued conditional probabilities.
So we built up an empirical statistical model for diabetes diagnosis problem, which is capable of handling the uncertainty in the observation itself. We considered fuzzy uncertainty for the amount of glucose in the urine and total ignorance in the observation for the blue toe; while no uncertainty was assumed on . It may be seen that it is very easy to combine different levels of uncertainty in our model. Carefully examining Table II, one finds   for  (69) for (70) So, in the presence of ignorance, blue toe does not seem a suitable symptom for the diabetes anymore. 
C. Empirical PDF
In a random sampling experiment, the members of a statistical society were asked about the number of cigarettes they smoked a day. Table III shows the results of a 2000 samples experiment.
There is no modification or preprocessing over the answers. Our model is capable of handling all kinds of uncertain observations directly, so there is no need for preprocessing to get rid of the uncertainty in the observation itself. Fig. 8 shows some fuzzy valued mean and probabilities for our model. So instead of a probability density function (pdf), we have a fuzzy body of evidence that was empirically derived and it is equivalent to a fuzzy set of consistent probability measures. So, we have a fuzzy set of possible pdf's instead of a single approximate one.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we tried to establish a firm foundation for a fuzzy generalization of the Dempster-Shafer theory. Models which are capable of handling two well-known types of uncertainty-randomness and fuzziness-would play an important role in the future of systems modeling. We started with the DST because it dealt with sets so it seemed more natural and much easier for building a stochastic fuzzy model. The existing fuzzy generalizations of the DST [4] , [5] , [7] - [9] , [12] were carefully studied. It seemed that there was an essential contradiction in these generalizations. While each generalization seemed natural and reasonable from a viewpoint, other generalizations seemed to have equal claim to being natural and reasonable from other viewpoints. In our suggested generalization a fuzzy valued probability measure resolved the problem. Our model yielded fuzzy valued and functions. These functions were fuzzy because of the fuzziness of the body of evidence itself. Belief and plausibility values of the previous generalizations are within the possible belief and plausibility values of our model. Our model will reduce to the DST for nonfuzzy body of evidence. Our and functions are equivalent to one another and to the fuzzy body of evidence. So, we may reconstruct the fuzzy body of evidence from , or , function. The applicability of our generalization was demonstrated in three benchmark applications. The model suggested in this paper is general and flexible. It has a better correspondence to the real world problems. It is remarkable that few assumptions and preprocessing were made in each application.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We prove a lemma first. 
Comparing (84) with (7), the following function (85) is equivalent with and if we consider this equivalence , the function would be equivalent to . We can prove the equivalence of function to considering , and is equivalent with both and functions based on the definition. Therefore, all these three functions are equivalent to one another to and to the fuzzy body of evidence. While we can reconstruct from (35), we obviously can reconstruct it from (37), which is more general. On the other hand, we can build up both (35) and (37) 
